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COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
Petitioner,

*
*
*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH

*

*
VS.

*
*

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and PAUL T. KIRBY,

*
*

Respondents.

APPELLATE CASE NO: 930374-CA
PRIORITY NO. 7

*

PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(12)
and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(1) grant the Utah Court of Appeals
jurisdiction over this Petition For Review.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Salt Lake Community College has raised three arguments in its
Petition For Review.

Respondent Kirby has replied to the second

and third of those arguments in his brief.

Respondent Industrial

Commission will reply to the College's first argument—that the
Anti-Discrimination
invalid.
issue.

Division's

Order

of

January

22,

1993

is

The Court has plenary authority over this purely legal
Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246,

247 (Utah App. 1990).

1

APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF STATUTE AND RULE
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann, S34-35-3
The commission shall have jurisdiction over the subject
of employment practices and discrimination made unlawful
by this chapter. There is hereby created a division of
the commission to be known and designated as the Utah
Antidiscrimination Division, which division shall be
under the jurisdiction and direction of the commission.
The division shall have as its immediate supervisory head
a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such
co-ordinator shall be appointed by the commission. Any
co-ordinator so appointed shall at all times be under the
direct supervision and control of the commission.
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-4
The antidiscrimination division shall consist of three
members who shall be members of the commission. The
commission may adopt, amend or rescind rules for
governing its meetings, and two commissioners shall
constitute a quorum.
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-5
(1)

The Utah Antidiscrimination Division may:
(a)
appoint
and
prescribe
the
duties
of
investigators and other employees and agents that it
considers necessary for the enforcement of this chapter;
(b) adopt, publish, amend, and rescind rules,
consistent with, and for the enforcement of, this
chapter;
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-7.1
(1) (a)
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by
himself, his attorney, or his agent, make, sign, and file
with the commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be
verified under oath or affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under this
section shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged
discriminatory
or
prohibited
employment
practice
occurred.
(2)
Any
employer,
labor
organization,
joint
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school who has
employees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse to
comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with
2

the commission a request for agency action asking the
commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by
conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly
assign an investigator to attempt a settlement between
the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall
make a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations
made in the request for agency action.
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees
shall conduct every investigation in fairness to all
parties and agencies involved, and may not attempt a
settlement between the parties if it is clear that no
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has
occurred.
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request
for agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of
a final order.
(4) (a)
If the initial attempts at settlement are
unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient
evidence during his investigation to support the
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice set out in the request for agency action, the
investigator shall formally report these findings to the
director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the
director may issue a determination and order for
dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) A party may make a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the
director's determination and order within 3 0 days of the
date of the determination and order for dismissal.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for
a hearing, the determination and order issued by the
director becomes the final order of the commission.
(5) (a)
If the initial attempts at settlement are
unsuccessful and the investigator uncovers sufficient
evidence during his investigation to support the
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice set out in the request for agency action, the
investigator shall formally report these findings to the
director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the
director may issue a determination and order based on the
investigator's report.
(c) A party may file a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the
director's determination and order within 30 days of the
date of the determination and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for
a hearing, the determination and order issued by the
3

director
requiring
the
respondent
to
cease
any
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to
provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final
order of the commission.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who
investigated the matter may not participate in a hearing
except as a witness, nor may he participate in the
deliberations of the presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the
party filing the request for agency action may reasonably
and fairly amend any allegation, and the respondent may
amend its answer. Those amendments may be made during or
after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding
officer.
(8) (a)
If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not engaged
in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice,
the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the
request for agency action containing the allegation of a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice.
(b) The presiding officer may order that the
respondent be reimbursed by the complaining party for his
attorneys/ fees and costs.
(9)
If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the
presiding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in
a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the
presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice and to provide relief to the
complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and
benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for
review of the order issued by the presiding officer in
accordance with Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review the
order issued by the presiding officer becomes the final
order of the commission.
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a)
is subject to judicial review as provided in Section
63-46b-16.
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance
with Title 63, Chapter
46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act.

4

RULES
Anti-Discrimination Rules—Utah Administrative Code R560-1-3.G.
For those procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be the Director
or the Director's designee. The presiding officer for
the formal hearing referred to in Section 34-35-7>l(6)(11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the Commission.
NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
For

purposes

of

the

issue

addressed

by

this

brief,

the

College's statement of the case is adequate.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

College

argues

that

the

Anti-Discrimination

Division's determination, which determination is the basis for this
proceeding, is invalid.
consider

the

The College's argument fails to properly

provisions

of

Utah's

Anti-Discrimination

Act.

Furthermore, because the College did not raise the validity of the
Division's

determination

during

the

administrative

proceeding

before the Commission, it cannot raise the issue now, for the first
time on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION'S
VALID.

DETERMINATION

IS

Whether the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination is
valid must be judged in the context of the entire administrative
procedure established by the Anti-Discrimination Act.

For that

reason, a summary of the administrative procedure is set forth
below.
5

The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (Utah Code Ann. §34-35-1 et
seq.)

creates

Utah's

"Anti-Discrimination

Division"

which

is

comprised of the three members of the Industrial Commission of
Utah.

Utah Code Ann. §34-35-4.

The Commission, as Utah's Anti-

Discrimination Division, has jurisdiction over unlawful employment
practices.

Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3.

The Anti-Discrimination Act grants the Commission specific
authority to:
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investigators
and other employees and agents that it considers
necessary for the enforcement of this chapter;
(b) adopt, publish, amend, rescind rules, consistent
with, and for the enforcement of this chapter. Utah Code
Ann. §34-35-5
While the Anti-Discrimination Act designates the Industrial
Commission as Utah's Anti-Discrimination Division, the Act creates
an administrative agency also known as the "Anti-Discrimination
Division". The Division is under the jurisdiction and direction of
the Commission.

Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3

The Act also provides for

a "director" of the Anti-Discrimination Division.
§34-35-3

Utah Code Ann.

The Director is answerable to the Commission:

The division shall have as its immediate supervisory head
a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such coordinator shall be appointed by the commission. Any coordinator shall at all times be under the direct
supervision and control of the commission, (emphasis
added) Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3.
In addition to creating the foregoing administrative apparatus
for enforcing the provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act, the
Act also establishes the following procedure for investigation and
adjudication of discrimination complaints:
6

1)

Any person may file a discrimination complaint with the

Commission.
2)

Utah Code Ann. 34-35-7.1(1)(a)

After a discrimination complaint is filed, the Commission

must assign an investigator to attempt settlement of the complaint.
Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(3)
3)

If

settlement

is

unsuccessful,

an

investigator

investigates the circumstances of the complaint and reports the
results of his or her investigation to the Director.

Utah Code

Ann. §34-35-7.1(4) and (5)
4)

Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director

may issue a determination and order based on the investigator's
findings.
5)

Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(5)(b)
A party aggrieved by the Director's determination may

request a de novo evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge.

The ALJ then issues an order, with no deference to the

Division's earlier determination. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(8) and
(9)
6)

A party aggrieved by the ALJ's decision may file a motion

for review of that decision with the Commission

itself.

The

Commission is not bound by the determination of the Division or
ALJ, and may affirm, reverse or modify the ALJ's decision as it
sees fit in the light of the evidence and law.

Utah Code Ann. §34-

35-7.1(11)
7)

The Commission's order is subject to appellate review

under §63-46b-16 of Utah's Administrative Procedures Act.
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(12)
7

Utah

The foregoing statutory steps are set forth in some detail to
address some of the misapprehensions raised in the College's brief.
When the College's argument is viewed in the context of the entire
procedure

established

by

the Anti-Discrimination

Act,

certain

important points stand out.
First, the Industrial Commission itself, serving as Utah's
Anti-Discrimination

Division, has full authority

to order

oversee the activities of the Anti-Discrimination Division.

and

While

the Anti-Discrimination Act uses the Anti-Discrimination Division
for

investigation

responsibility

and

screening,

final

remains with the Commission,

administrative

and

not with

the

Director.
Second,

the

Division

Director's

discrimination complaints is limited.

role

in

adjudication

of

The Director is involved

only at the early "screening" stages of the administrative process.
The Director's discretion is also limited. The Anti-Discrimination
Act directs the Director to issue her determination "based on the
investigator's report".

Thus, the Director's personal involvement

is not essential to the adjudication of a discrimination complaint.
Third,

the

Anti-Discrimination

Act

has

established

an

administrative procedure that provides ample opportunity to correct
any error made in the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination.
Simply by asking for a hearing, an aggrieved party obtains a de
novo

evidentiary

proceeding.

Once

an evidentiary

hearing

is

requested, the Division's determination is of no further operative
effect.

Consequently, the College was not prejudiced by any
8

alleged error made in the Division's informal determination, since
any such error could easily be corrected at an evidentiary hearing.
Fourth and finally, the Commission has exercised its authority
to appoint subordinates and promulgate rules in such a way as to
resolve the very argument raised by the College.

The Commission's

Rule R560-1-3.G provides:
For those procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be the Director
or the Director's designee. (emphasis added)
Thus, as needed, the Director can allow a designee to fulfill her
functions.
In this case, the Director deemed it necessary to recuse
herself from this case due to her associations in the recent past
with the defendant.

While it is true that the reasons for the

Director's recusal have been submitted by affidavit for the first
time on appeal, that is simply due to the fact that the College did
not raise the validity of the Division's determination during the
earlier proceedings.

The Commission cannot be expected to respond

to an argument until that argument is raised.
In

summary,

the

Division

Director's

delegation

of

her

functions in this case was proper under the provisions of the AntiDiscrimination

Act

and

the

associated

Commission.

9

rules

adopted

by

the

POINT TWO
HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
DIVISIONS
ORDER
BEFORE
THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, THE COLLEGE CANNOT RAISE THAT
ISSUE ON APPEAL.
Utah's appellate courts have consistently held that issues
that could have been raised before an administrative agency, but
were not, cannot later be raised for the first time on appeal,
Alvin G. Rhoades Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d
1244, 1249 (Utah 1984);

Rekward v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d

166 (Utah App. 1988)
The College did not challenge the validity

of the Anti-

Discrimination Division's Order at any time during the proceedings
before the Commission.

Recognizing that its failure to raise the

issue is fatal to its attack on the validity of the Order, the
College attempts to frame the issue as one of "jurisdiction".
In United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 73
S.Ct 67, 68 (1952) the United States Supreme Court dealt with a
similar

issue,

arising

from

a

challenge

to

an

order

of

the

Interstate Commerce Commission, based upon the improper appointment
of a hearing examiner, which challenge was raised for the first
time on appeal.

Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson stated:

Appellee did not offer nor did the (lower) court require
any excuse for its failure to raise the objection upon at
least one of its many opportunities during the
administrative proceeding . . . .
The apparent reason for complacency was that it was not
actually prejudiced by the content or manner of
appointment of the examiner. . . . The issue is clearly
an afterthought, brought forward at the last possible
moment to undo the administrative proceedings without
consideration of the merits and can prevail only from
10

technical compulsion irrespective of considerations of
practical justice.
(We) hold that the defect in the examiner's
appointment was an irregularity which would invalidate a
resulting order if the Commission had overruled an
appropriate objection made during the hearing. But it is
not one which deprives the Commission of power or
jurisdiction, so that even in the absence of timely
objection the order should be set aside as a nullity.
In citing the foregoing opinion, the Commission in no way
concedes that, in the case before the Court, the Director's recusal
and

delegation

improper.

of

her

function

to

another

was

irregular

or

Rather, the opinion is cited for the proposition that

even if an irregularity occurred, it is not jurisdictional in
nature and must be raised during the administrative proceedings in
order to be preserved for consideration on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Court should disregard the College's challenge to the
validity of the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination, since
that issue was raised for the first time on appeal. Alternatively,
if the Court concludes it is proper to consider that issue, the
Court should conclude that the Division's determination is valid,
DATED this 1st day of April, 1994.

By
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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Deputy Solictor General
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Alan Hennebold
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COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
Petitioner,

*
*
*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH

*

*
VS.

*
*

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and PAUL T. KIRBY,

*
*

APPELLATE CASE NO: 930374-CA
PRIORITY NO. 7

*

Respondents.

*
*

PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Ann- §34-35-7.1(12)
and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(1) grant the Utah Court of Appeals
jurisdiction over this Petition For Review.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Salt Lake Community College has raised three arguments in its
Petition For Review.

Respondent Kirby has replied to the second

and third of those arguments in his brief.

Respondent Industrial

Commission will reply to the College's first argument—that the
Anti-Discrimination
invalid.
issue.

Divisions

Order

of

January

22,

1993

is

The Court has plenary authority over this purely legal
Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246#

247 (Utah App. 1990).

1

APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF STATUTE AND RULE
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann, S34-35-3
The commission shall have jurisdiction over the subject
of employment practices and discrimination made unlawful
by this chapter. There is hereby created a division of
the commission to be known and designated as the Utah
Antidiscrimination Division, which division shall be
under the jurisdiction and direction of the commission.
The division shall have as its immediate supervisory head
a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such
co-ordinator shall be appointed by the commission. Any
co-ordinator so appointed shall at all times be under the
direct supervision and control of the commission.
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-4
The antidiscrimination division shall consist of three
members who shall be members of the commission. The
commission may adopt, amend or rescind rules for
governing its meetings, and two commissioners shall
constitute a quorum.
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-5
(1)

The Utah Antidiscrimination Division may:
(a)
appoint
and
prescribe
the
duties
of
investigators and other employees and agents that it
considers necessary for the enforcement of this chapter;
(b) adopt, publish, amend, and rescind rules,
consistent with, and for the enforcement of, this
chapter;
Utah Code Ann. 534-35-7.1
(1) (a)
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by
himself, his attorney, or his agent, make, sign, and file
with the commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be
verified under oath or affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under this
section shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged
discriminatory
or
prohibited
employment
practice
occurred.
(2)
Any
employer,
labor
organization,
joint
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school who has
employees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse to
comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with
2

the commission a request for agency action asking the
commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by
conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly
assign an investigator to attempt a settlement between
the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall
make a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations
made in the request for agency action.
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees
shall conduct every investigation in fairness to all
parties and agencies involved, and may not attempt a
settlement between the parties if it is clear that no
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has
occurred.
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request
for agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of
a final order.
(4) (a)
If the initial attempts at settlement are
unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient
evidence during his investigation to support the
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice set out in the request for agency action, the
investigator shall formally report these findings to the
director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the
director may issue a determination and order for
dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.
(c) A party may make a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the
director's determination and order within 30 days of the
date of the determination and order for dismissal.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for
a hearing, the determination and order issued by the
director becomes the final order of the commission.
(5) (a)
If the initial attempts at settlement are
unsuccessful and the investigator uncovers sufficient
evidence during his investigation to support the
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice set out in the request for agency action, the
investigator shall formally report these findings to the
director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the
director may issue a determination and order based on the
investigator's report.
(c) A party may file a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the
director's determination and order within 30 days of the
date of the determination and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for
a hearing, the determination and order issued by the
3

director
requiring
the
respondent
to
cease
any
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to
provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final
order of the commission.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who
investigated the matter may not participate in a hearing
except as a witness, nor may he participate in the
deliberations of the presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the
party filing the request for agency action may reasonably
and fairly amend any allegation, and the respondent may
amend its answer. Those amendments may be made during or
after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding
officer.
(8) (a)
If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not engaged
in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice,
the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the
request for agency action containing the allegation of a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice.
(b) The presiding officer may order that the
respondent be reimbursed by the complaining party for his
attorneys' fees and costs.
(9)
If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the
presiding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in
a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the
presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice and to provide relief to the
complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and
benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for
review of the order issued by the presiding officer in
accordance with Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review the
order issued by the presiding officer becomes the final
order of the commission.
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a)
is subject to judicial review as provided in Section
63-46b-16.
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance
with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative
Rulemaking Act.
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RULES
Anti-Discrimination Rules—Utah Administrative Code R560-1-3.G.
For those procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be the Director
or the Director's designee. The presiding officer for
the formal hearing referred to in Section 34-35-7>l(6)(11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the Commission.
NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
For

purposes

of

the

issue

addressed

by

this

brief,

the

College's statement of the case is adequate.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

College

argues

that

the

Anti-Discrimination

Division's determination, which determination is the basis for this
proceeding, is invalid.
consider

the

The College's argument fails to properly

provisions

of

Utah's

Anti-Discrimination

Act.

Furthermore, because the College did not raise the validity of the
Division's

determination

during

the

administrative

proceeding

before the Commission, it cannot raise the issue now, for the first
time on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION'S
VALID.

DETERMINATION

IS

Whether the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination is
valid must be judged in the context of the entire administrative
procedure established by the Anti-Discrimination Act.

For that

reason, a summary of the administrative procedure is set forth
below.
5

The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (Utah Code Ann. §34-35-1 et
seq.)

creates

Utah's

"Anti-Discrimination

Division"

which

is

comprised of the three members of the Industrial Commission of
Utah.

Utah Code Ann. §34-35-4.

The Commission, as Utah's Anti-

Discrimination Division, has jurisdiction over unlawful employment
practices.

Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3.

The Anti-Discrimination Act grants the Commission specific
authority to:
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investigators
and other employees and agents that it considers
necessary for the enforcement of this chapter;
(b) adopt, publish, amend, rescind rules, consistent
with, and for the enforcement of this chapter. Utah Code
Ann. §34-35-5
While the Anti-Discrimination Act designates the Industrial
Commission as Utah's Anti-Discrimination Division, the Act creates
an administrative agency also known as the "Anti-Discrimination
Division". The Division is under the jurisdiction and direction of
the Commission.

Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3

The Act also provides for

a "director" of the Anti-Discrimination Division.
§34-35-3

Utah Code Ann.

The Director is answerable to the Commission:

The division shall have as its immediate supervisory head
a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such coordinator shall be appointed by the commission. Any coordinator shall at all times be under the direct
supervision and control of the commission, (emphasis
added) Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3.
In addition to creating the foregoing administrative apparatus
for enforcing the provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act, the
Act also establishes the following procedure for investigation and
adjudication of discrimination complaints:
6

1)

Any person may file a discrimination complaint with the

Commission.
2)

Utah Code Ann. 34-35-7.1(1)(a)

After a discrimination complaint is filed, the Commission

must assign an investigator to attempt settlement of the complaint.
Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(3)
3)

If

settlement

is

unsuccessful,

an

investigator

investigates the circumstances of the complaint and reports the
results of his or her investigation to the Director.

Utah Code

Ann. §34-35-7.1(4) and (5)
4)

Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director

may issue a determination and order based on the investigator's
findings.
5)

Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(5)(b)
A party aggrieved by the Director's determination may

request a de novo evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge.

The ALJ then issues an order, with no deference to the

Division's earlier determination. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(8) and
(9)
6)

A party aggrieved by the ALJ's decision may file a motion

for review of that decision with the Commission

itself.

The

Commission is not bound by the determination of the Division or
ALJ, and may affirm, reverse or modify the ALJ's decision as it
sees fit in the light of the evidence and law.

Utah Code Ann. §34-

35-7.1(11)
7)

The Commission's order is subject to appellate review

under §63-46b-16 of Utah's Administrative Procedures Act.
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(12)
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The foregoing statutory steps are set forth in some detail to
address some of the misapprehensions raised in the College's brief.
When the College's argument is viewed in the context of the entire
procedure

established

by

the Anti-Discrimination

Act,

certain

important points stand out.
First, the Industrial Commission itself, serving as Utah's
Anti-Discrimination

Division, has

full authority

to order

oversee the activities of the Anti-Discrimination Division.

and

While

the Anti-Discrimination Act uses the Anti-Discrimination Division
for

investigation

responsibility

and

screening,

remains with

final

the Commission,

administrative

and

not with

the

Director.
Second,

the

Division

Director's

discrimination complaints is limited.

role

in

adjudication

of

The Director is involved

only at the early "screening" stages of the administrative process.
The Director's discretion is also limited. The Anti-Discrimination
Act directs the Director to issue her determination "based on the
investigator's report".

Thus, the Director's personal involvement

is not essential to the adjudication of a discrimination complaint.
Third,

the

Anti-Discrimination

Act

has

established

an

administrative procedure that provides ample opportunity to correct
any error made in the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination.
Simply by asking for a hearing, an aggrieved party obtains a de
novo

evidentiary

proceeding.

Once

an evidentiary

hearing

is

requested, the Division's determination is of no further operative
effect.

Consequently, the College was not prejudiced by any
8

alleged error made in the Division's informal determination, since
any such error could easily be corrected at an evidentiary hearing.
Fourth and finally, the Commission has exercised its authority
to appoint subordinates and promulgate rules in such a way as to
resolve the very argument raised by the College.

The Commission's

Rule R560-1-3.G provides:
For those procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be the Director
or the Director's designee. (emphasis added)
Thus, as needed, the Director can allow a designee to fulfill her
functions.
In this case, the Director deemed it necessary to recuse
herself from this case due to her associations in the recent past
with the defendant.

While it is true that the reasons for the

Director's recusal have been submitted by affidavit for the first
time on appeal, that is simply due to the fact that the College did
not raise the validity of the Division's determination during the
earlier proceedings.

The Commission cannot be expected to respond

to an argument until that argument is raised.
In

summary,

the

Division

Director's

delegation

of

her

functions in this case was proper under the provisions of the AntiDiscrimination

Act

and

the

associated

Commission.

9

rules

adopted

by

the

POINT TWO
HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
DIVISIONS
ORDER
BEFORE
THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THE COLLEGE CANNOT RAISE THAT
ISSUE ON APPEAL.
Utah's appellate courts have consistently held that issues
that could have been raised before an administrative agency, but
were not, cannot later be raised for the first time on appeal.
Alvin G. Rhoades Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d
1244, 1249 (Utah 1984);

Rekward v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d

166 (Utah App. 1988)
The College did

not challenge the validity

of the Anti-

Discrimination Division's Order at any time during the proceedings
before the Commission.

Recognizing that its failure to raise the

issue is fatal to its attack on the validity of the Order, the
College attempts to frame the issue as one of "jurisdiction".
In United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 73
S.Ct 67, 68 (1952) the United States Supreme Court dealt with a
similar

issue,

arising

from

a

challenge

to

an

order

of

the

Interstate Commerce Commission, based upon the improper appointment
of a hearing examiner, which challenge was raised for the first
time on appeal.

Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson stated:

Appellee did not offer nor did the (lower) court require
any excuse for its failure to raise the objection upon at
least one of its many opportunities during the
administrative proceeding . . . .
The apparent reason for complacency was that it was not
actually prejudiced by the content or manner of
appointment of the examiner. . . . The issue is clearly
an afterthought, brought forward at the last possible
moment to undo the administrative proceedings without
consideration of the merits and can prevail only from
10

technical compulsion irrespective of considerations of
practical justice.
(We) hold that the defect in the examiner's
appointment was an irregularity which would invalidate a
resulting order if the Commission had overruled an
appropriate objection made during the hearing. But it is
not one which deprives the Commission of power or
jurisdiction, so that even in the absence of timely
objection the order should be set aside as a nullity.
In citing the foregoing opinion, the Commission in no way
concedes that, in the case before the Court, the Director's recusal
and

delegation

improper.

of

her

function

to

another

was

irregular

or

Rather, the opinion is cited for the proposition that

even if an irregularity occurred, it is not jurisdictional

in

nature and must be raised during the administrative proceedings in
order to be preserved for consideration on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Court should disregard the College's challenge to the
validity of the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination, since
that issue was raised for the first time on appeal. Alternatively,
if the Court concludes it is proper to consider that issue, the
Court should conclude that the Division's determination is valid.
DATED this 1st day of April, 1994.

By
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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State of Utah
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
LABOR / ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
Norman H Bangerter
Governor
Karen Suzuki-Okabe
Director

Stephen M Hadley
Chairman

Mailing Address
Industrial Commission of Utah
Labor Division, ?0 Box 146630
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 6630
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160 East 300 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone (801) 530 6801

Thomas R Carlson
Commissioner
Colleen S Colton
Commissioner

January 22, 1993
UADD No. 92-0590
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611

Mr. Paul S. Kirby
290 North 5th East
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Re:

Paul S. Kirby vs. Salt Lake Community College

Dear Mr. Kirby:
Enclosed please find your copy of the Anti-Discrimination
Division's Determination and Order for the above referenced
charge.
Sincerely,
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Director
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State of Utah
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
Stephen M Hadle\
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Michael O Leavitt
Governor

Anna R Jensen
Director

Heber Wells Bldg Third Floor
160 East 300 South
PO Box 146640
Salt Lake City Utah 84114 6640

Chairman

Thomas R Carlson
Commissioner

Phone (801) 530 6801
Fax # (801) 530 7609

PAUL S. KIRBY
COMPLAINANT,

Colleen S Colton
Commis

*

UADD NO. 92-0590
EEOC NO. 35C-92-0611

VS.

*
*

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
RESPONDENT.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

D E T E R M I N A T I O N
JURISDICTION
Under the authority vested in me by the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Act, of 1965, as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, I issue on behalf of this Division, the following
Determination as to the merits of the subject charge.
All jurisdictional requirements have been met as required by the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
SUMMARY OF CHARGE
On August 26, 1992, Paul S. Kirby, hereinafter Charging Party,
alleged that Salt Lake Community College, hereinafter Respondent,
discriminated against him based upon his sex, race, religion, and
retaliated against him.
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE
The Respondent categorically denies that Charging Party was
subjected to discrimination, because of his sex, race, religion, or
that it retaliated against him.
SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION
A.

Charging Party's Allegations

Charging Party asserts that he was employed as an adjunct professor
at Respondent during 1991. Charging Party asserts he ran into a
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class scheduling conflict during the 1991 fall quarter. Charging
Party asserts that he notified Mr. Stowers of such conflict.
Charging Party asserts that he was eventually able to resolve the
matter, and teach the class, but asserts that such incident caused
Mr. Stowers to have animosities towards him.
Charging Party asserts that subsequently, before winter quarter of
1991, Charging Party went into Mr. Stower's office to look at his
schedule. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers told him that if
anything occurred again like the scheduling conflict he had during
fall quarter, Charging Party would never teach at Respondent again.
Charging Party asserts that thereafter, he and Mr. Stowers did not
speak to each other very often.
Charging Party asserts that he was the most qualified applicant for
the position, yet someone much less qualified than himself was
afforded said position. Charging Party asserts that he attempted
to resolve his concerns with Respondent's human resource
department, to no avail.
Charging Party asserts that in April, 1992, he submitted an
application for a Spanish instructor position with Jonathan
Stowers, Respondent's language coordinator. Charging Party asserts
that he was denied due consideration for such employment, because
he is non-hispanic, male, L.D.S., and because he objected to
homosexual inferences during an interview with Mr. Stowers.
Charging Party asserts that during his interview, Mr. Stowers
received a telephone call. Charging Party asserts that after Mr.
Stowers finished such call, he made sexual overtones towards
Charging Party. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers stated
that he was so excited to hear this person's voice, that he almost
wet his pants. Charging Party asserts that he was offended by Mr.
Stower's mannerism. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stower's knew
that Charging Party was not homosexual.
Charging Party asserts that subsequently during his interview,
Charging Party commented about his Spanish L.D.S. mission, and how
it had helped him with his knowledge of the Spanish language and
culture. Charging Party asserts that during such discussion, Mr.
Stowers squirmed, and made expressions that looked unfavorable.
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers also served a L.D.S.
mission. Charging Party asserts however, that Mr. Stowers has made
negative comments to his students regarding the L.D.S. religion.
Charging Party asserts that he followed the proper chain of
command, and requested information from Barbara Pomerang, Kay
Waters and Carlos Jimenez of Respondent's affirmative action
committee, David Richardson, Respondent's dean, and Anne Erickson,
Respondent's vice president, as to why Charging Party fell out of
the running for the subject position. Charging Party asserts that
2
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said individuals either didn't know why he was dropped, or did not
sufficiently answer his questions. Charging Party asserts that Mr.
Jimenez told him that he had thoroughly investigated: Charging
Party's case to see if religious discrimination was evident, and
that he had interviewed the five employment committee members.
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Jimenez refused to give him a copy
of his investigative report.
Charging Party asserts that Mr.
Jimenez's investigation was not satisfactory.
Charging Party asserts that he was qualified for the subject
Spanish instructor position.
Charging Party asserts that said
position required a masters of science (hereinafter "M.S.," or a
masters of art (hereinafter MM.A.,!) degree in Spanish, or a closely
related field. Charging Party asserts that he has received two
B.A.'s in political science and Spanish, respectively. Charging
Party asserts that he received his masters degree in language and
literature, with a Spanish emphasis, in 1991.
Charging Party
asserts that he has received a variety of scholarships, has been in
various honor societies, and graduated with a 3.8 G.P.A., in the
aforesaid graduate field.
Charging Party asserts that teaching experience is preferred for
the subject Spanish instructor position. Charging Party asserts
that he has such experience, as he has taught Spanish at the
University of Utah since 1988, at the Division of Continuing
Education, and is currently an adjunct Spanish instructor at
Respondent.
Charging Party asserts that he has taught forty
courses during his teaching career (i.e. five credit hours).
Charging Party further asserts that he has also taken teaching
methodology classes at the University of Utah.
Charging Party
further asserts that he has participated in workshops presented by
the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, Inc.
Charging Party asserts that preference for the subject Spanish
instructor position was to be given to candidates with demonstrated
strengths in community college teaching. Charging Party points out
that his student evaluations at Respondent's community college,
show that he had great success in the classroom, and was able to
relate well to his students.
Charging Party asserts that non-teaching related work experience
was preferred for the subject position. Charging Party asserts
that prior to, and during his studies as a student and as a
teacher, at the University of Utah, he worked an average of 25 to
30 hours per week in non-academic employment.
Charging Party
asserts that such non-academic employment consisted of: assistant
manager of produce at Smith's Food King; member of a saxophone
quartet, which performed "pro bono11 for convalescent homes, schools
etc.; donated time to help Hispanic immigrants learn basic survival
Spanish in the Salt Lake City area; donated time as a translator
for world conferences for the L.D.S. church; and worked as a court
interpreter for Spanish speaking individuals.
3
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Charging Party asserts that the subject Spanish instructor position
was filled by Laura Gaona-Bradford (hereinafter "Bradford").
Charging Party asserts that Ms. Bradford did not have heir masters
degree at the time she applied for, and was interviewed for said
position. Charging Party asserts that Ms. Bradford still did not
have her masters degree as of October, 1992.
Charging Party
asserts that Ms. Bradford received her associate degree from
Respondent, but does not have teaching experience at Respondent.
Charging Party asserts that he has been discriminated against
because of his sex, and his race. Charging Party asserts that Ms.
Bradford is a female, Hispanic immigrant of Mexican heritage.
Charging Party asserts that Respondent/s policy is to hire women
and minorities to fill college goals. Charging Party asserts that
such action is reverse discrimination, because Respondent's offers
positions because of a person's circumstance rather then he or she
being the most qualified.
B.

Respondent's Answer to Charging Party's Allegations

Respondent contends that for affirmative action, an additional
procedure had been initiated whereby all search committees are
required to interview the top two qualified minorities in every
applicant pool, regardless of their total point ranking.
Respondent contends that those applicants that meet minimum
qualifications are then screened against a written set of criteria,
based upon the job qualification posted in the position
announcement.
Respondent contends that Charging Party applied for the Spanish
faculty position.
Respondent contends that Charging Party's
application was received on April 30, 1992. Respondent contends
that Charging Party was selected for, and interviewed by its search
committee, based upon his ranking on set criteria.
Respondent
contends that Charging Party was then ranked number eleven out of
thirteen applicants interviewed, and was not referred to the
dean/division chair.
Respondent contends that the top six
applicants were referred on as the search committee's final
candidates for said position.
Respondent contends that the subject Spanish position was filled by
Laura Gaona-Bradford, a Hispanic female. Respondent contends that
her application was received on April 29, 1992.
Respondent
contends that Ms. Bradford was hired on July 30, 1992, as a fulltime salaried employee, and started her employment in fall quarter,
1992.
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was hired because of her
strong educational background, excellent command of the Spanish
language (i.e. her native language), and her teaching experience.
4
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Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was one of the two final
applicants forwarded to the vice president by the dean. Respondent
contends that such decision was based on Ms. Bradford's .ranking of
structured questions asked by the dean and division chair.
Respondent submits a summary of its investigatory report conducted
by Carlos Jimenez. Mr. Jimenez contends that his investigation
consisted of interviewing all search committee members.
Mr.
Jimenez contends that through such investigation, he was unable to
find any evidence regarding Charging Party's allegations of
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or retaliation. Mr.
Jimenez contends that at no time, as reported by the search
committee members, was there any discussion formally or informally
regarding any of the candidates' race, sex, or religion.
Mr.
Jimenez further contends that he also found no evidence of Charging
Party's allegation that he was retaliated against.
ANALYSIS
Charging Party has brought this action against Respondent alleging
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section
2000(e), and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, Utah Code
Annotated Sec. 34-35-6(1)(a), which provides that an employer may
not discriminate against an employee on the basis of his/her sex,
race, religion, or retaliate against any employee.
A.

Prima Facie Case of Sex Discrimination

In order to prove discrimination based on sex exists, Charging
Party must prove: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he is
qualified for the position; 3) he has been subjected to an adverse
employment action; 4) similarly situated individuals, of a
different class, were or would have been subjected to different
treatment.
Charging Party is a member of a protected class, male. Charging
Party was qualified for the position of Spanish instructor, as he
had met all of the minimum qualifications for such position.
Charging Party has been subjected to an adverse employment
decision, as he was not hired for the aforesaid position. The next
question is whether or not similarly situated individuals of a
different class, were or would have been subjected to different
treatment.
The record indicates that both Charging Party, a white male, and
Laura Bradford, a Hispanic female, applied for the same Spanish
faculty position. The record indicates that such position required
that the applicant, at a minimum, have a masters degree in Spanish
or a closely related field. The record indicates that Charging
Party had said masters degree, but was not hired for the subject
position. The record indicates that Ms. Bradford was hired for the
5
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subject position, despite the fact that she did not possess the
required masters degree. Therefore, Charging Party has established
a prima facie case of sex discrimination.
B.

Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination

In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based
upon race, the Charging Party must show that he is a member of a
protected class and that he has been treated less favorable than
others in circumstances which give rise to an inference of
intentional discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Charging Party is a member of a protected class, white. The next
question is whether or not Charging Party has been treated less
favorable than others in circumstances which give rise to an
inference of intentional discrimination.
The record indicates that both Charging Party, a white male, and
Laura Bradford, a Hispanic female, applied for the same Spanish
faculty position. The record indicates that such position required
that the applicant, at a minimum, have a masters degree in Spanish
or a closely related field. The record indicates that Charging
Party had said masters degree, but was not hired for the subject
position.
The record indicates however, that Ms. Bradford was
hired for the subject position, despite the fact that she did not
possess the required masters degree. Therefore, Charging Party has
established a prima facie case of race discrimination.
C.

Prima Facie Case of Religious Discrimination

In order to establish a prima facie case of Religious
Discrimination Charging Party must prove that: 1) he was a member
of a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the position; and 3)
he was not hired for said position because of his religious
affiliation.
Charging Party must maintain this burden to
demonstrate that he was treated differently than similarly situated
employees.
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stower's apparent dislike for the
L.D.S. religion was a factor in his rejection of Charging Party for
the subject position. However, the record indicates that Charging
Party was not a member of the protected class, as he was active
L.D.S. Charging Party has not asserted or established that his
active L.D.S. status was in the minority at Respondent.
Furthermore, Charging Party has not asserted or established that
Ms. Bradford, the successful candidate, was non-L.D.S. or inactive
L.D.S. Therefore, Charging Party has failed to establish a prima
facie case of religion discrimination.
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D.

Prima Facie Case of Retaliation Discrimination

In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
discrimination, Charging Party must demonstrate:
1) that he
engaged in activities protected by the Act or Title VII; 2) the
Respondent thereafter subjected him to adverse employment action;
3) and that a causal link exists between the two. Love v. RE/MAX
of America, Inc. , 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984); Burrus v.
United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 459
U.S. 1071 (1982).
The record indicates that although there was some animosity
between Charging Party and Mr. Stowers, Charging Party did not
assert any claim of discrimination until after Ms. Bradford was
hired, and he filed this claim.
Therefore, Charging Party has
failed
to
establish
a prima
facie
case
of
retaliation
discrimination.
E.

Comparison

Charging Party asserts that he is a white male, who possessed the
minimum requirements for a Spanish faculty position, but was not
hired.
Charging Party asserts that Laura Bradford, a Hispanic
female, was given said faculty position, despite her failure to
possess the minimum requirements for such position.
F.

Respondent's Burden

The next question is whether or not Respondent has articulated a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. Respondent's
arguments are set forth below for completeness.
Respondent contends that for affirmative action, an additional
procedure had been initiated whereby all search committees are
required to interview the top two qualified minorities in every
applicant pool, regardless of their total point ranking.
Respondent contends that those applicants that meet minimum
qualifications are then screened against a written set of criteria,
based upon the job qualification posted in the position
announcement.
Respondent contends that Charging Party applied for the Spanish
faculty position.
Respondent contends that Charging Party's
application was received on April 30, 1992. Respondent contends
that Charging Party was selected for, and interviewed by its search
committee, based upon his ranking on set criteria.
Respondent
contends that Charging Party was then ranked number eleven out of
thirteen applicants interviewed, and was not referred to the
dean/division chair.
Respondent contends that the top six
applicants were referred on as the search committee's final
candidates for said position.

7
^r\V?

i%(X

Respondent contends that the subject Spanish position was filled by
Laura Gaona-Bradford, a Hispanic female. Respondent contends that
her application was received on April 29, 1992.
.Respondent
contends that Ms. Bradford was hired on July 30, 1992, as a fulltime salaried employee, and started her employment in fall quarter,
1992.
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was hired because of her
strong educational background, excellent command of the Spanish
language (i.e. her native language), and her teaching experience.
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was one of the two final
applicants forwarded to the vice president by the dean. Respondent
contends that such decision was based on Ms. Bradford's ranking of
structured questions asked by the dean and division chair.
Respondent submits a summary of its investigatory report conducted
by Carlos Jimenez. Mr. Jimenez contends that his investigation
consisted of interviewing all search committee members.
Mr.
Jimenez contends that through such investigation, he was unable to
find any evidence regarding Charging Party's allegations of
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or retaliation. Mr.
Jimenez contends that at no time, as reported by the search
committee members, was there any discussion formally or informally
regarding any of the candidates' race, sex, or religion.
Mr.
Jimenez further contends that he also found no evidence of Charging
Party's allegation that he was retaliated against.
The record indicates that the subject Spanish faculty position was
posted on March 27, 1992, and was closed on April 30, 1992. The
record indicates that the minimum qualifications for such position
are as follows:
1.
2.
3.

M.S. or M.A. degree in Spanish or closely related field
required.
Teaching experience preferred. Preference is given to
candidates with demonstrated strength in community
college teaching.
Non-teaching related work experience preferred.

The record indicates that at the time of his interview, Charging
Party had a masters degree in languages and literature with a
Spanish emphasis.
The record indicates that the successful
applicant, Laura Bradford, did not have a masters degree at the
time of her interview, and was not expecting to receive such degree
until June, 1992, nearly two months after the subject position
closed.
The record indicates that both Charging Party and Ms. Bradford had
teaching experience. The record indicates that Charging Party had
more college level teaching experience.
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The record indicates that Charging Party had demonstrated strength
in community college teaching, whereas Ms. Bradford did not have
any community college teaching experience.
The record indicates that both Charging Party and Ms. Bradford had
similar non-teaching related work experience. The record indicates
that Charging Party appears to have had more such experience.
The record indicates that Ms. Bradford did not have the minimum
requirements for the subject position, as she did not have a
master's degree, or the preferred
levels of experience.
Furthermore, as a result of such deficiency, and according to
Respondent's policy, Ms. Bradford should not have been considered
for the subject position.
Therefore, Respondent has not
articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.
G.

Summary

Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie case of
religion and retaliation discrimination. However, Charging Party
has established a prima facie case of sex and race discrimination.
Therefore, the facts in the record, viewed in their entirety,
indicate that there is REASONABLE CAUSE to believe that Charging
Party was subjected to discriminatory practices as alleged. This
concludes the Division's informal investigative adjudication
procedure.
ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION,

y

Randall Phillips, Investigator

Collen Trayner, Esquire

Date

Date
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
UADD Case No. 92-0590
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611
PAUL S. KIRBY
COMPLAINANT,

*
*
*

VS.

*

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
RESPONDENT.

*
*

O R D E R

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
7>

. . .

. . .

On January 2?£t 1993, the Anti-Discrimination Division (Division) of the
Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) issued a determination of
"Reasonable Cause" that the Respondent has violated the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
If the Respondent is desirous of attempting to conciliate this Determination,
this must be done by contacting the director within ten (10) days from the
date of this Order.
Failure to reach conciliation shall result in the
Respondent being required to provide the following relief:
RELIEF
The Respondent, UTAH COMMUNITY COLLEGE, is hereby ordered to provide full
relief to Charging Party, PAUL S. KIRBY. Full relief shall include:
1.

That Respondent provide Charging Party with a position commensurate with
a full-time faculty position in Spanish, effective immediately;

2.

Further, that the Respondent agrees to provide Charging Party with all
lost wages, plus 10%;

3.

Further, that no retaliation be brought by Respondent against the
Charging Party for bringing this action;

4.

Further, that Charging Party be awarded reasonable attorneys fees;
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Further, that Respondent reaffirms its commitment to comply with the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code
Annotated, as amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended.

If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a written request for a formal
hearing must be filed with the Director of the Division within thirty (30)
days from the date of the issuance of this Order as specified in Section 3435-7.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. A request
for agency review and a formal hearing will not be considered necessary if
the hearing will not add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause
the evidence to be viewed differently.

If the Director receives no timely request for a hearing, this Order becomes
the final Order of the Commission with no further rights of appeal as
specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d), U.C.A.

Colleen Trayner, Esquire

Date

Q

REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

SALT i
LAKE I
COMMUNITY
COLLEGE
4600 South Redwood Road / P.O. Box 30808 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0808
Telephone (801) 967-4111 FAX (801) 965-8008

February 18, 1993

Ms. Anna Jensen
State of Utah
Industrial Commission of Utah
Anti-Discrimination Division
160 East 300 South, Third Floor
s a l t Lake c i t y , UT 84111
Re:
Paul s . Kirby
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UADD N o , 9 2 - 0 5 9 0

EEOC No- 35C-92-0611
Dear Ms- Jensen:
This letter is in response to the Division's determination and
order dated January 22, 1993, filed with the Anti-Discrimination
Division. The Salt Lake Community College is respectfully
requesting that a formal hearing be granted based on the
following supportive information.
As I indicated earlier in my investigative report, which included
interviewing all search committee members, there was no evidence
supporting the charging party's allegations- The search
committee members reported that at no time was there any
discussion formally or informally regarding any of the candidates
race, sex, or religion.
Please find below a response to each of the Division's findings
of Sex and Race Discrimination.
A.

Prima Facie Case of Sex Discrimination

Our response to the Division's findings is as follows. The
hiring of Laura Bradford was contingent upon her completion of
her master's degree. As stated in the advertisements, the
master's degree was not required until the fall of 1992.
Therefore, Ms. Bradford could and did complete her master's
degree at any time during fall quarter of 1992.
B.

Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination

Our response to the Division's findings is as follows. The
charging party asserts that he was treated less favorably than
others. His assumptions are unfounded. The correct evidence as

,

,
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Ms- Anna Jensen

2

February 23, 1993

stated above, is the master's degree was not required until
sometime during the fall of 1992. The record will show that Ms.
Laura Bradford did indeed fulfill this requirement by completing
requirements for the degree during fall of 1992.
Ms. Bradford filled all expectations of the job as advertised.
(Attachments) The decision to hire Ms. Bradford was based on her
qualifications, not gender. The Division concluded a prima-facie
case of sex and race discrimination based on unfounded
assumptions and erroneous understanding. The Division's analysis
relied on the fact that Ms. Bradford didn't have an MS degree.
The correct evidence is, the master's degree was not required
until sometime during fall quarter and the two attached
announcements clearly demonstrate this. Further, she did fulfill
the requirements of the master's degree during fall quarter.
This is common practice in higher education.
Furthermore, the Salt Lake Community College feels that a formal
hearing should also be granted based on the fact that the hiring
of Ms. Laura Bradford was consistent with the College's hiring
procedures and our Affirmative Action Plan. To have decided
otherwise would have put the College in violation of our own
internal procedures.
In addition, we ask that the conclusions of "religious
discrimination11 and "retaliation" decided in our favor by the
investigator be upheld.
Your favorable response to this request is appreciated. If I can
be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me at
967-4561.
Sincerely,

Carlos A. Jimenez j ^
Director <t>f Divers/ty/EO

CJ/cb
cc:

V

/

Colleen Trayner
Randall Phillips
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6615
Paul S. Kirby,
Charging Party,
vs.
Salt Lake Community College,

*
*

ORDER OF
DISMISSAL

*
*
*

UADD No. 92-0590
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611
Respondent.

*

*********************************

The request for an evidentiary hearing in the above
entitled matter to review de novo the Determination and Order of
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division having been duly considered,
and it having been determined that the RESPONDENT has failed to:
File its request for de novo review within 3 0 days of the
date of the order as required by R560-1-4A(3) of the Utah Admin,
Code (1993);
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good
cause for dismissing the request,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the
RESPONDENT be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission
within thirty (3 0) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or
appeal. A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested;
state the date upon which it was mailed; and be sent by mail to the
undersigned, and to each party.

Timothy^ c7 M i e n
Presiding (jfcamini
nministrative Law Judge
Certified by the Industrial Commission of
Utah this / / & d a y of~?W«^^L
1993.
ATTEST:
'
Patricia O

Commission Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March /J , 1993, a copy of the
attached Order of Dismissal in the UADD case of Paul S. Kirby vs.
Salt Lake Community College, was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:
Paul S. Kirby
290 North 5th East
Kaysville, UT 84037
Carlos A. Jimenez
Director of Diversity/EO
Salt Lake Community College
P.O. Box 30808
SLC, UT 84130-0611
Anna R. Jensen
Director
Industrial Commission of Utah
UADD Division
160 East 300 South
SLC, UT 84114-6630

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By ~ ^ L C » < - ^ /So^u^r^f^^

Wilma Burrows
Adjudication Division
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MOTION FOR REVIEW

BECEIVEDV
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
JOHN S. MCALLISTER (2140)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-3220
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF UTAH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION

PAUL S. KIRBY,
Charging Party,

:

vs.

:

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,

:

Respondent.

:

OBJECTION TO AND MOTION FOR
REVIEW OF ORDER OF DISMISSAL
UADD No. 92-0590
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611

Respondent Salt Lake Community College through its
counsel John S. McAllister, Assistant Attorney General, enters
its Motion for Review and its written objection to the Order of
Dismissal dated March 11, 1993, received March 12, 1993, by
Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge, which
orders that the request of Respondent Salt Lake Community College
for evidentiary hearing and review de novo

be dismissed without

prejudice and allowing Objection To and Motion for Review of the
Order of Dismissal to be filed within 30 days of the date of said
order, March 11, 1993.

00587

FACTS
Paul Kirby, the Charging Party and Complainant in this
matter filed his complaint with the Utah Anti-discrimination
Division (UADD) alleging discrimination based on sex, race,
religion and retaliation when Salt Lake Community College hired
another person for a faculty position.

The UADD investigator

made a determination that there was no discrimination with regard
to religion or retaliation, but found cause for a prima facie
case for sex and race discrimination.

The investigator relied on

the sole fact that the position required a Master's degree and
Mr. Kirby, a white male with a Master's degree was unsuccessful
and the position was awarded to a "female hispanic immigrant of
mexican heritage despite the fact that she did not possess the
required Master's degree."

She was awarded her degree in the

fall.
The investigator's report and order were signed on
January 22, 1993, and received by Respondent on January 26, 199 3.
In the order Respondent was allowed 30 days from the date of the
order January 22, 1993, to file a request for a hearing and
review.

The 30 days period ended on Sunday, February 21, 1993.

The request for review was filed on Tuesday, February 23, 1993.
No allowance was made for mail delivery time by the UADD thus
effectively reducing the time period to 24 days.
-2-
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Complainant through his counsel filed a Motion to
Strike Respondent's Request for a Hearing because it was untimely
(not filed within the 30 day period).

Complainant's motion was

dated March 5, and received on March 8, 199 3.

Respondent fiLed

its response and explanation on March 12, 199 3.
On March 11, 1993, presiding Administrative Law Judge
Timothy C. Allen signed an Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice,
denying Respondent's Request for Review de novo
not filed within the 30 day period.

because it was

The denial resulted in an

order with Complainant's pleading dated March 5, before the
division, and Respondent's pleading dated March 12, not before
the division:

OBJECTION TO DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENT'S REQUEST
Respondent objects to the order of March 11, 1993,
because:
1)

The order was made only 3 days after receipt of

Complainant's pleading on March 8, 1993, and without any
reasonable opportunity for Respondent to reply.
2)

The order was made with only Complainant's pleading

before the division with absolutely no consideration of
Respondent's reply which was filed on March 12, only four days
after receipt of Complainant's motion.
-3-
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3)

No system of pleading which allows pleading by mail

has any period so short as 3 days.

To decide a matter on such

short notice with only one party's pleading before it is
manifestly unfair and prejudicial to Respondent and clearly
contrary to the law which require the division to be fair and
unbiased toward both parties.

MOTION FOR REVIEW
Respondent Salt Lake Community College hereby moves for
a review of this matter and for a full and complete evidentiary
hearing for the following reasons:
1.

The order of March 11, 199 3, signed by presiding

Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen dismisses Respondent's
First Request for Review "without prejudice."

Without prejudice

clearly means that the request can be brought before the division
again.
Also, the order clearly states that a new Motion for
Review can be filed by Respondent within 30 days from March II,
1993.

The order further stares that only if a. new Motion for

Review is filed after the 30 day period will the order of March
11, 199 3, become the final order of the commission and not
subject to further review by the commission.

-4-
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Because this Motion for Review and Objection is timely,
the order of January 22, 1993, and the order of March 11, 199 3,
are subject to review.
2.

Respondent has further information to place before

the commission which it believes will cause the division to view
differently its previous finding of a prima facie case of
discrimination-

Without a full review and hearing the Respondent

will be severely and unfairly prejudiced in this matter.
a.

The investigative report, findings and order are

based solely on the allegation that the hispanic female did not
have a Master's degree.

The true and accurate fact is that the

position was advertised according to the College's customary
practice to require that the degree be earned in the fall of the
year.

The masters degree was earned in compliance with that

practice, but the investigator ignored that material fact.
b.

Respondent has an affirmative action plan which

requires the College to take affirmative action regarding
hispanic persons and females.

The plan is a legal requirement

consistent with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
objectives.

The College is required to follow its own plan.

The

investigator was aware of this plan, but ignored it in his
analysis of a prima facie case.

The requirement of the College

-5-
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to follow its own policy is a fact critical to any considered
analysis.
c.

The investigator totally ignored the College

selection process.

In this case the hispanic female received a

higher ranking than Complainant in the screening process and a
much higher score in the interview.

Thus, the person selected

was selected on her merits and qualifications for the particular
position, not because she was hispanic or female.

But the

investigator's analysis leaves the individuals' relative
qualifications totally without consideration.
If the order is allowed to stand, the result will
compel the College to substitute the Complainant for the better
qualified person, a result totally contrary to the College's
policy of selecting the best person for the job.
d.

The law and division rules clearly allow time

periods to be enlarged and responses to be amended.

The time

period should be enlarged to accept Respondent's response and the
response should be amended to reflect the supporting information
with the true and accurate information about the College's
selection.

To continue to rely on the investigator's inadequate

analysis and incorrect assumptions is unfair and prejudicial.
In summary of its Motion for Review, Respondent College
followed its own policy and practice in selecting the person best
-6-
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qualified for the position.

The person obtained a Master's

degree as specified and in the time required.

The selection was

not based on race or sex, and was consistent with the affirmative
action plan.
The investigator's analysis is incomplete and his
findings are based on insufficient information.
findings, report and order are seriously flawed.

In short, his
The College is

entitled to place the true and correct information before the
commission or division in fair and impartial hearing before a
final determination is made.

RELIEF REQUESTED
Respondent Salt Lake Community College requests an
impartial review.

Such review is absolutely necessary.

All the

information and documents relevant to the Respondent's decision
to employ the best qualified person without illegal
discrimination on the basis of sex or race must be considered
before a final decision is made.
The Respondent further requests that its initial
response be amended as necessary to reflect the full and complete
basis for its decision.
The Respondent further requests that the order of March
11, 1993, dismissing Respondent's request for an evidentiary
-7-
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hearing be reversed and the review allowed; or, in the
alternative that a hearing and review be granted by the
commission as stated in the order of March 11, 19 93.
Respondent reserves the right to amend its response and
supplement its pleadings by affidavit prior to a hearing as
allowed by division rules.
Dated this

//

day of March, 1993.

Lssistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent
Salt Lake Community College

CERTIFICATE OF FILING
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing
Objection To and Motion for Review of Order of Dismissal was hand
delivered by me personally to the Utah Anti-discrimination
Division Office on the

day of March, 1993.

s. MCALLISTER
5sistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent
Salt Lake Community College

-8-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

Ay^JZ

^y

day of

, 1993, I mailed an accurate photocopy of the

foregoing Affidavit of J, Clark Whitehead to the following
address:
Louise T. Knauer
Attorney for Complainant
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
Carlos A, Jimenez
Director of Diversity and Equal
Opportunity
Salt Lake Community College
P.O. Box 30808
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130

-6-
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW

PAUL S. KIRBY,

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600
*

Charging Party,
vs.
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
*

Respondent.

*

UADD No. 920590

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the
Motion for Review of the charging party in the above captioned
matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §§ 34-35-7.1(11) and 6346b-12.
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) issued a "cause"
finding in the above captioned matter by Order dated January 22,
1993. The Order stated that the non-prevailing party had 30 days
to request an evidentiary hearing. On February 23, 1993, the UADD
received the respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing. The
request for an evidentiary hearing was denied by order issued on
March 11, 1993, because it was not filed within 30 days of the date
the order was issued as required by U.A.C. R560-1-4A(3) and U.C.A.
§ 34-35-7.1(4) (c) .
Our decision in this case is based upon
jurisdictional issues and, therefore, we will not address the
merits of the underlying case.
On March 11, 1993 the Commission received a letter from
respondent which stated that the respondent, "had a conversation
with the Director of UADD, Ms. Anna Jensen. I had indicated to her
that the College would indeed request a review of the findings by
UADD...." The letter stated that n[t]he reason for the delay was
due to a recent college internal procedural change.
The new
procedure requires such correspondence as the one requested to be
circulated and viewed by appropriate College department heads."
Letter from Mr. Jimenez, 03/11/93.
On March 17, 1993, the respondent filed its motion for review
of the ALJ's March 11, 1993 order raising three issues:
(1)
whether the commission failed to allow a reasonable opportunity for
Respondent to respond to the charging party's pleading before the
order was issued; (2) whether the order was issued without
consideration of Respondent's reply memorandum; and (3) whether the
commission's action was manifestly unfair and prejudicial to
Respondent and clearly contrary to the law which requires the
Division to be fair and unbiased toward both parties.
The respondent, citing U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9), requested that
the commission allow additional time for filing its motion for
review after the time for filing had run.
The charging party
asserts that U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9) does not apply in this case
because the time period in question is set out in U.C.A. § 34-35-
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7.1(4)(c), not the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA).
§ 63-46b-l(9) provides that:

U.C.A.

Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time
period prescribed in this chapter, except those
time periods established for judicial review.
In order for a provision in a statute such as the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act to supersede a similar provision in the UAPA, the
statute must make explicit reference to the UAPA. U.C.A. § 63-46b1(1). U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(4) (c) does not state that it is intended
to supersede the time periods set out in the UAPA, and therefore, the
time for filing a request for formal hearing is governed by U.C.A. §
63-46b-12. However, there is no conflict as both statutes establish
a 30 day time period for filing an appeal.
However, the Court of Appeals in
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v.
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), held that the time for
filing a motion for review to the Industrial Commission is
jurisdictional. The court reasoned that the mandatory language in
the statute terminated the commission's jurisdiction once the filing
time period was exceeded and noted that its interpretation of the
statute was consistent with Utah appellate court decisions on similar
time limits. Lamoreaux at 570. U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(d) provides that,
,f
[i]f the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the
determination and order issued by the director becomes the final
order of the commission.,f
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and
authority of the court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot proceed."
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah
App. 1987) .
If a court acts beyond its
authority those acts are null and void. Jd. . . .
The sources of jurisdictional limits may vary
according to they type of court involved.
However, it is basic that "the jurisdictional
limits of a statutorily created court... are
circumscribed by
its empowering legislation."
Id.
It
follows
that
the
subject matter
jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial administrative
agency, such as the Industrial Commission, which
is a statutory creation, would also be "fixed by
statute."
Retherford v. Industrial Comm'n of
Utah, 739 P.2d 76, 80 (Utah App. 1987). Just
as any court, the
Commission should first
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determine that it has jurisdiction and, if it
does not, dismiss the matter.
Any action
beyond its jurisdiction is void,
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Ut. Ct. App.
1989) .
An agency order is considered "issued" on the date the order
is signed by the administrative law judge or commission.
Bonded
Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Empl. Sec. , 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA,
12/04/92).
Therefore, the order in this matter was issued on
January 22, 1992 and that is the date that the time for filing
began to run. The Respondent failed to timely request an extension
of time in which to file or timely file its motion for review.
Therefore, the commission lacks jurisdiction to take any action
other than to dismiss this matter.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the ORDER OF DISMISSAL issued by the
administrative law judge on March 11, 1993 is hereby affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of the order, pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dep't of
Empl. Sec, et al., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA, 12/4/92).
The
requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of
the hearing for appeals purposes.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

2CL

<^Z^^frv^

Colleen S. Colta
Commissioner
Certified this /j£ tL day of *~}VJr<^
ATTEST:

1993,

Patricia 0. Ashbyj
I
Commission Secret?*-^ "
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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
JOHN S. MCALLISTER (214 0)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-3220
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF UTAH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
PAUL S. KIRBY,
Charging Party,
vs.

:
:

RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND
CLARIFICATION OF THE
COMMISSION'S ORDER

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
UADD No. 92-0590
Respondent.
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611
Respondent Salt Lake Community College through its
counsel John S. McAllister, Assistant Attorney General, moves the
Industrial Commission of Utah for a reconsideration and
clarification of its order dated May 14, 1993:
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the ORDER OF DISMISSAL issued
by the administrative law judge on March 11, 1993 is
hereby affirmed,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to
the Utah Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of
the order, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 6346B-16, and Couriers v. Dep't of EmpL Sec, et al., 201
Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA, 12/4/92). The requesting party
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shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the
hearing for appeals purposes.
The foregoing order precludes Respondent from due process for the
sole reason that its request for a hearing was one day beyond the
30 day period set for filing requests.

This Motion to Reconsider

or Clarify is made for the following reasons:
1.

The order of March 11, 1993, by the Administrative

Law Judge, and affirmed by the Commission Order quoted above
dismisses this matter "without prejudice."

This phrase clearly

implies that Respondent can move again for a hearing and one
could be granted.

It must be remembered that the Administrative

Law Judge made his order on March 11, 1993, with Complainant's
pleading but without Respondent's pleading before him.

The

result was either to allow Respondent to request a hearing
"without prejudice" or to deny the request for a hearing which
denial is manifestly unfair.

If a hearing is denied, then the

Commission ought to clarify the phrase "without prejudice" which
was affirmed by its Order of May 14, 1993.
2.

The Commission's order of May 14, 1993, recognizes

three issues raised by Respondent, but declines to discuss or
consider the issues.

The Commission relies on the case of Varian

- Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) to
support its determination of no jurisdiction.

-2-

Lamoreaux does not compel an outright dismissal.
Lamoreaux reversed the Commission and remanded for a hearing to
determine the effect of the Administrative Law Judge's order.
The Commission should remand this case to the Administrative Law
Judge to clarify his order consistent with Lamoreaux.
Moreover, the Lamoreaux opinion relies on the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (U.R.C.P.) to calculate the time period
for an Industrial Commission appeal:
"Such motion [for review] must be filed
within fifteen days of the date of any order
of the administrative law judge or
commission-..." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.55
(1987) (effective until Jan. 1, 1988).
Additional days will be allowed when the
filing is sent by mail or when the last day
of the period falls on a weekend or a
holiday. Utah R.Civ.P. 6.
Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 ftnt. 1. (emphasis supplied).

In

footnote one the Court of Appeals indicates that Rule 6 U.R.C.P.
is applicable.

If Rule 6 is applicable to compute time it is

also applicable to allow time for mailing.

Rule 6 clearly

requires 3 days to be added when documents are served by mail:
(e) Additional time after service by mail.
Whenever a party has the right or is required
to do some act or take some proceedings
within a prescribed period after the service
of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3
days shall be added to the prescribed period.
Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P.
-3-

In this case, the original order was signed on January
22, 1993, and served by mail and received and date stamped on
January 26, 1993.

Rule 6 clearly requires 3 extra days to allow

a party to take action when he has been served by mail and he is
required to take that action within a prescribed period.

In this

case because the original order was served by mail Respondent had
33 days or until February 24, 1993, and its filing was timely
under the correct application of Rule 6, U.R.C.P., pursuant to
Lamoreaux.

See also Griffith v. Industrial Commission/ 399 P.2d

204 (Utah 1965) where the Utah Supreme Court held that Rule 6(e)
U.R.C.P. was not inconsistent with and not clearly inapplicable
to Industrial Commission procedure and therefore supplemented
Commission procedure to allow timely filing of a petition for
rehearing not filed within the 30 day period,
3.

Most cases are judged on their merits.

In this

case the original investigator's report was erroneous and
incomplete.

The investigator selected certain evidence and

ignored other material facts.

Respondent should be given a

hearing to demonstrate that the investigator's prima facie
determination of discrimination is erroneous and unfair.
Respondent's Affidavit as to the correct evidence is on file.
A hearing would develop appropriate evidence and
findings as a basis for a correct considered decision which could
-4-

then be reviewed.

To preclude Respondent from a hoaiu

manifestly unfair and in direct violation of tho legi*>
• > - The
direction to investigate in fairness to all parties.
Commission should allow the investigator, the D>L° C
Administrative Law Judge to correct this mistakeWherefore, Respondent respectfully requests
Industrial Commission of Utah for a reconsideration of
^ Hndinqs before
decision and to allow a hearing with evidence nno
<-\,<z the Commission to
making a final order. Further, Respondent asks i-n
clarify the order affirmed being '"without prejudice.
Dated this

day of May, 199-*-

d i s t a n t Attorney General
Counsel
for Community
^ ^ " ^ " V o College
llece
Salt Lake

CERTIFICATE OF FILING
• • i ^f t-hp foregoing
I hereby certify that the original of w e
^r t-hp Commission's
Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification ot cue
Order was hand delivered by me personally to the Uta
1 Q Q "3

IS*

discrimination Division Office on the sh£>

da

Y

of

May

'

A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
Counsel
for Community
^ 3 P ° n d ^ t College
r o l l e a e
S a l t Lake

-5"
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this "^C

day of May, 1993, I

mailed an accurate photocopy of the foregoing Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification of the Commissions's Order to
the following address:
Louise T. Knauer
Attorney for Complainant
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Carlos Jimenez
Director of Diversity
Salt Lake Community College
P.O. Box 30808
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
J. Clark Whitehead
Director, Personnel Services
Salt Lake Community College
P.O. Box 30808
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130

-6-
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600
PAUL S. KIRBY,

*
*

vs.

Charging Party,

*
*
*

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,

*

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND CLARIFICATION

*

Respondent-

*

UADD No. 92 0590

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the
Motion for Review of the respondent in the above captioned matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-13.
The respondent timely
the commissions denial
administrative law judge's
a formal hearing under the

filed a motion for reconsideration of
of its motion for review of an
(ALJ) order dismissing its request for
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act.

The respondent requests (1) that the commission clarify the
phrase "without prejudice" in the ALJ's order which was affirmed by
the commission, and (2) that the commission re-examine its
determination that it lacks jurisdiction to hear its motion for
review. We will examine these issues in reverse order.
I. DOES RULE 6(e) APPLY TO EXTEND THE
PERIOD FOR FILING A MOTION FOR REVIEW?
The respondent argues that Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux, 767 P. 2d
569 (Ut. App. 1989) (Lamoreaux I) , does not compel an outright
dismissal and points to footnote one of that opinion which states
in part that, "Additional days will be allowed when the filing is
sent by mail or when the last day of the period falls on a weekend
or a holiday. Utah R. Civ. P. 6." Lamoreaux I, 767 P. 2d 569, 570,
fn. 1. The respondent further asserts that the Utah Supreme Court
in Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 300 P.2d 204 (Utah 1965),
held that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. was not inconsistent with and not
clearly inapplicable to Industrial Commission procedure and
therefore supplemented Commission procedure to allow timely filing
of a petition for rehearing not filed within the 30 day time
period.
In Lamoreaux I the commission granted the untimely filed
motion for review and reversed the ALJ. The commissions decision
was appealed by the respondent to the court of appeals which held
that the time limit for filing a motion for review before the
commission was jurisdictional. The case was remanded so that the
commission could take evidence on the issue of whether the
applicant's motion for review was timely filed.
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Griffith and Lamoreaux I are both pre-Utah Administrative
Procedure Act (UAPA) decisions. The Utah Supreme Court in Griffith
concluded that Rule 81(a) U.R.C.P., which provides that lf[t]hese
rules shall apply to all special statutory proceedings, except
insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable11
applied the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to supplement the rules
of procedure of the Industrial Commission. The Griffith Court held
that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. applies to extend the time for filing a
petition for rehearing when the notice was served by mail. Rule 1,
U.R.C.P., however, provides that "[t]hese rules shall govern the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, the circuit
courts, and the justice courts of the state of Utah in all actions,
suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law
or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as
governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the
Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81."
In a later ruling, the Utah Supreme Court noted that lf[w]hile
the mode of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil
procedure in the trial courts are not necessarily applicable to
administrative proceedings. See e.g. Silverman v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) ....
Thus,
administrative proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure unless the governing statute or regulations so
provide." Pilcher v. Dep't of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah
1983). We believe that the rule articulated in Pilcher correctly
determines the applicability of the U.R.C.P. to administrative
proceedings in Utah.
The UAPA provides in relevant part that "except as otherwise
provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by
specific reference to this chapter, the provisions of this chapter
apply to every agency of the state of Utah..." U.C.A. §~63-46b1(1) (1992) . The UAPA does not state generally that the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure apply to all administrative proceedings. To the
contrary, the UAPA contains only limited, specific references to
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(4)(b)
(providing that Rules 12(b) and 56 U.R.C.P. apply to motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment except to the extent that those
rules are modified by UAPA); U.C.A. § 63-46b-7 (providing that the
rules of discovery under the U.R.C.P. apply if the agency has not
enacted rules for discovery); U.C.A. § 63-46b-ll(3) (providing that
a defaulted party may file a motion to set aside a default order
under the procedures outlined in the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b15(2) (providing that a petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint governed by the
U.R.C.P. and that all other pleadings and proceedings in the
district court are governed by the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b19(1)(c) (providing that the venue for proceedings to enforce
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agency orders is governed by the requirements of the U.R.C.P.).
Therefore, under Pilcher, it is clear that under UAPA, only
those sections of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly
adopted by UAPA or the agency, or those which expressly state they
are intended to apply under UAPA, apply to administrative
proceedings in Utah.
II. CLARIFICATION OF THE PHRASE
"WITHOUT PREJUDICE" IN THE COMMISSIONS ORDER.
The respondent notes that the order issued by the ALJ on March
11, 1993 was issued "without prejudice."
The use of the term
"without prejudice" indicates that the dismissal was not based on
the merits of the underlying case. We believe that we erred in
simply affirming the ALJ's dismissal and that we should have
dismissed the matter outright based upon our own review of the
matter for lack of jurisdiction.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW AND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the District
Court of the State of Utah within 3 0 days of the date of the order,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-15, Alumbaugh
v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990), and Couriers v. Dep't of
Empl. Sec, et al., 201 Utah Adv. Rep.^7^ (CA, 12/4/92).

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

<W^T\

Colleen S. Coltbn
Commissioner
Certified this / ^
AT3

^fc^^Jd?

Patricia 0. Ashb;
Commission Secretv

day of

s/P?^>^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER ON
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION±n the case of PAUL S.
KIRBY, Case Number 920590, on ^t/, day of (Jt^^k..
, 19£3
to the following:
-^
LOUISE T. KNAUER
261 EAST 300 SOUTH, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
J. CLARK WHITEHEAD
DIRECTOR, PERSONNEL SERVICES
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
P O BOX 30808
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84130
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOHN S MCALLISTER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER, SUITE 1100
36 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
PAUL S. KIRBY
290 NORTH 5TH EAST
KAYSVILLE, UTAH 84037
CARLOS A. JIMENEZ
DIRECTOR OF DIVERSITY/EEO
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
P O BOX 30808
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84130
ANNA R. JENSEN, DIR.
UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
TIMOTHY C. ALLEN
ADJUDICATION DIVISION

Adell Butler^Mitchell

Paralegal
General Counsel's O f f i c e
I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah
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